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Abstract 
In response to Hansson Wahlberg (2013), this paper argues, first, that he misunderstands 
the redescription principle developed in my book The Causal Power of Social Structures, and 
second, that his criticisms rest on an ontological individualism that is taken for granted but in 
fact lacks an adequate ontological justification of its own. 
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I would like to thank Tobias Hansson Wahlberg for his careful attention to my work in his 
recent paper in this journal (2013), which focuses on some central elements of my argument 
for the existence and causal powers of social entities or objects (Elder-Vass 2010). However, 
I wish to correct some apparent misunderstandings of my argument and its significance.  
As Hansson Wahlberg makes clear, I claim that social entities or objects have emergent 
causal powers in what is often considered to be a weak sense of emergence (e.g. Stephan 
2002: 79): that they have powers their parts would not have, even collectively, if they were 
not organised into the relevant sort of whole by virtue of a characteristic set of relations that 
obtains when parts of this sort are organised into a whole of this sort. I offer justifications for 
this as a general ontological perspective and seek to apply it to social entities composed (at 
least in part) of individual human beings, including, for example, organisations, queues, and 
norm circles. Although he does discuss some of these examples, the thrust of his criticism is 
directed against the more abstract aspects of the argument, and this response focusses on 
what I take to be the two main criticisms. The first, I will suggest, is simply an error of 
interpretation, whereas the second is more significant as it reflects the views of a range of 
other philosophers. 
Hansson Wahlberg begins by discussing what I have called the redescription principle. 
The relevant paragraph from Elder-Vass (2010) states: 
This is the principle that if we explain a causal power in terms of (i) the parts of an 
entity H; plus (ii) the relations between those parts that pertain only when they are 
organised into the form of an H; then because we have explained the power in terms 
of a combination – the parts and relations – that exists only when an H exists, we have 
not eliminated H from our explanation. The entities that are H’s parts would not have 
this causal power if they were not organised into an H, hence it is a causal power of H 
and not of the parts. The lower level account of H’s powers merely redescribes the 
whole, which remains implicit in the explanation. In other words ‘upper- and lower-
level accounts refer to the same thing, as a whole and as a set of configured 
interacting parts’ (Wimsatt 2006: 450) and hence a casual explanation which invokes 
the set of configured interacting parts implicitly invokes the same ontological 
structure as one that invokes the whole. As Geoff Hodgson has put it, in a discussion 
of methodological individualism, ‘explanations in terms of individuals plus relations 
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between them amounts to the introduction of social structure alongside individuals in 
the explanantia’ (Hodgson 2007: 211). (Elder-Vass 2010: 24-5). 
Hansson Wahlberg doubts that the redescription principle can be sustained, on the 
grounds that identity statements are invalid when they identify singular entities with 
pluralities. Presumably this comment is aimed at my use (and indeed Wimsatt’s) of “the 
same” in the quoted paragraph (I have also used similar locutions elsewhere) and the 
identification of the parts (and connecting relations) of a whole as a plurality. After several 
pages of criticism based on this claim, he suggests that if I wish “to avoid eliminating social 
objects… [I] must say that they are either: composed of individuals interrelated in appropriate 
ways (where the individuals and the relations may differ over time)…” [and he offers an or 
that is not relevant to this response] (Hansson Wahlberg 2013: 9). Composition, however, is 
not “the same thing as identity” (Hansson Wahlberg 2013: 10). 
In using the phrase “the same ontological structure”, however, I did not intend to claim 
that the identity conditions over time of a set of parts are the same as those of a corresponding 
whole. I hope that I can correct any misunderstandings by making this clear now. My 
argument is that (a) a set of configured interacting parts that compose a given whole at a 
given time, including both the parts themselves and the relations between them, is necessarily 
indistinguishable in terms of its causal capacities from (b) the whole itself at that same time. 
Thus an explanation of an apparent causal effect of that whole as an effect of that set of parts 
and relations is one that fails to eliminate the whole itself from the explanation, since it 
merely substitutes an alternative description of that whole as it exists at that moment in time 
for the concept of the whole itself in the explanation. This is thoroughly consistent with the 
view, which I also hold, that social objects are indeed “composed of individuals interrelated 
in appropriate ways (where the individuals and the relations may differ over time)” (Hansson 
Wahlberg 2013: 9), and I discuss the issues involved in changes in objects and social objects 
at several points in the book, in ways that should make it apparent that I do hold this view 
(notably Elder-Vass 2010: 35-8 and 133-8). Hansson Wahlberg’s discussion of identity 
theory is thus irrelevant to my argument (and incidentally also rests on a somewhat perverse 
reading of it). 
As Hansson Wahlberg goes on to say, I argue that if we are to make sense of the causal 
powers of the parts of a whole, we must consider what causal impacts they could have in a 
counterfactual scenario “in which the higher-level object no longer exists because the 
required organization of its parts is lacking” (Hansson Wahlberg 2013: 11). Any further 
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causal powers beyond these, that exist when the higher-level object does but not otherwise, 
are causal powers, and relationally emergent properties, of the higher-level object in its own 
right. Hansson Wahlberg, however, dismisses such powers as “diluted and uninteresting” 
(Hansson Wahlberg 2013: 11). He takes the view that for a social object to have a causal 
power of its own at time t, this would have to be a power that was “not merely the sum (or net 
effects) of the impacts of its proper parts interrelated as they in fact are interrelated at t” 
(Hansson Wahlberg 2013: 10) – what is generally thought of as a strongly emergent property 
(Stephan 2002: 79). 
One of his reasons for taking my view of causal powers to be diluted and uninteresting is 
derived from the discussion of identity covered above. The second, however, is that “no one 
denies that the way entities are arranged and interrelated makes a difference to causation, and 
to suppose otherwise is to turn one’s attention to a straw man” (Hansson Wahlberg 2013: 11). 
This is closely related to an earlier comment that “no sensible ontological individualist will 
deny that people can be organized in certain ways, interact, and enter into the kinds of 
relation with one another with which Elder-Vass is concerned, and thereby cause things they 
would otherwise not have caused” (Hansson Wahlberg 2013: 5). In making such claims, he is 
thoroughly in tune with mainstream thinking in the philosophy of mind, which has frequently 
seen only strong versions of emergence theory as worth investigating, and with individualists 
in the social sciences, who think they can make use of organization and relations in their 
explanations without thereby committing themselves to the belief that social objects have 
powers. In a particularly perceptive discussion of the same book Julie Zahle has suggested 
that this is the most problematic question for my argument: why are individualists not entitled 
to make use of such elements in their explanations? (Zahle 2014). 
Perhaps the simplest response I can make to that question is to say that if individualists do 
wish to make use of them they need to justify why they can. Individualist responses to weak 
or relational emergentist arguments seem to take for granted that ontological individualism is 
coherent and justified. Yet they tend to do so without offering any analysis of the nature of 
causality in general or of how we might justify claims for causal significance. The only 
argument that seems to be proffered is that social wholes cannot be causally significant 
because we can offer explanations of their purported causal contributions to social events 
purely in terms of the causal influence of individuals and the ways in which they are 
organised and related (a claim that is taken to be true in principle for ontological reasons in 
every case, even if it happens that in some cases that we don’t have a fully adequate 
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explanation in such terms). Yet if this argument can be applied to social wholes, 
individualists owe us an explanation of why it cannot also be applied to human individuals. If 
we did so, it would seem to imply that human individuals are not causally significant either 
because we can in principle explain their actions in terms of the influence of their parts and 
the ways in which they are organised and related. How, then, can they justify the claim that 
individuals are real and causally significant while social wholes are not? Unless ontological 
individualists can offer a coherent answer to this question, their own argument saws off the 
branch upon which they are sitting (and of course, because we can apply the argument 
recursively, it saws off all the lower branches and the tree trunk too, with the consequence 
that causality disappears from our world altogether, unless there is some bottom level of 
fundamental particles to which the argument does not apply) (cf Block 2003). 
By contrast, one of the merits of my argument is that it applies equally to both human 
individuals and social objects. Both, I argue, are wholes with relationally emergent causal 
powers that differ from the independent causal powers of their parts, and both as a 
consequence are causally significant. Unlike the arguments for ontological individualism 
noted above it does seem to provide us with a potentially coherent way of understanding 
causality in general. Indeed, I would argue that if we wish to make general claims about 
causality in the social world then this requires that we have a general theory of causality 
against which we can assess such claims,
 1
 and ontological individualism is incoherent in the 
absence of such a theory. 
No doubt the relational version of emergence theory advocated here is less mysterious, 
less exciting, and less ambitious than the kind that philosophers of mind have sought for so 
long. But we have no need for these strong emergence theories, and indeed it seems highly 
questionable whether there are any emergent properties in this strong sense.
2
 What we do 
need is ontological theories that are compatible with the successful practices of actual 
science, and thus with us living (as we do) in the kind of world in which such practices can 
be successful.
3
 In particular, we need theories that are compatible with two key features of 
that practice. First, a vast range of entities are accepted as having causal significance; and 
second, this causal significance is taken to be compatible with the production of explanations 
of how it arises (Gell-Mann 1995: 112). Relational emergence theory meets both of these 
                                                 
1
 This is why Tsilipakos is wrong to criticise my book for developing such a general framework (Tsilipakos 
2012). 
2
 Parts of this paragraph are drawn from Elder-Vass (2014). 
3
 I take this to be one of the core arguments of Bhaskar’s Realist Theory of Science (1975). 
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requirements, and provides us with an ontological framework that recognises the need for 
sciences of each level of structure: sciences that recognise which macro structures have 
which kinds of causal influence and also seek to explain how they can have it. This is all we 
need from the concept of emergence. And this gives us all that we need by way of resisting 
eliminative reductionisms like the ontological individualism discussed by Hansson Wahlberg: 
it enables us to justify the assertion that higher level entities including social objects have 
causal powers while resisting the anti-scientific insistence that such powers are in some sense 
uncaused or unexplainable. We can often explain the mechanisms through which the 
interaction of parts configured as they are in a certain kind of whole produces the causal 
powers of the whole. The fundamental error of eliminative reductionisms like ontological 
individualism is to believe that the possibility of offering such explanations entails that 
wholes and their powers are both causally and explanatorily irrelevant. 
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